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Firms have two major ways to service foreign markets: they can produce at home and 
export their goods and services (“cross-border exports”), or they can establish themselves 
in foreign markets, produce there and then sell their goods and services in those markets 
or elsewhere (what could be called “establishment trade”1). World establishment trade is 
estimated to amount to US$31 trillion, considerably exceeding world cross-border exports, 
at US$23 trillion, in 2017.2  
 
Accordingly, assessing the performance of a country’s firms requires looking at cross-
border trade and establishment trade together, to obtain a more holistic picture of the 
international competitiveness of firms, as reflected in firms’ market share and, ultimately, 
profitability.  
 
Establishment trade (i.e., the sales of foreign affiliates) is the result of FDI, typically 
undertaken on the basis of superior technology, marketing and managerial talent, as well 
as other competitive ownership advantages held by parent firms: they establish affiliates 
abroad primarily to better access these markets and avail themselves of local resources. 
Doing so helps firms to strengthen their international competitiveness. This objective is 
shared by every country in which firms are headquartered, because strengthening their 
firms’ competitiveness is a precondition for creating more employment, increasing wages 
and continuing to export.  
 
The choice between cross-border exports and establishment trade—both typically 
controlled by parent firms—depends on what is more profitable for firms when seeking to 
service foreign markets and strengthen their international competitiveness.  Moreover, the 
two types of trade are intertwined: cross-border exports can lead to FDI (e.g., when exports 
become uncompetitive and hence production is delocalized), and FDI can lead to cross-
border exports (e.g., when foreign affiliates import components or headquarters services 
from the home country to produce their goods and services). A caveat needs to be made, 
however, for services: since most services still need to be produced when and where they 
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are consumed, service firms typically have to undertake FDI to sell in foreign markets, thus 
generating establishment trade.  
 
This reality applies to all countries, including the China-US trade relationship. 
 
Using 2016 data published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of 
Commerce, 3  US cross-border arm’s length exports of goods and services to China 
amounted to US$156 billion; to this, one would have to add US$266 billion in arm’s length 
sales generated by majority-owned US affiliates in China (excluding sales of such affiliates 
in China to other US affiliates in China and to other countries), for a total of US$422 billion 
in trade. During the same year, US cross-border arm’s length imports of goods and services 
from China amounted to US$461 billion;4 to this, one would have to add US$26 billion in 
establishment trade generated by majority-owned Chinese affiliates in the US (excluding 
sales of goods of such affiliates in the US to other countries), for a total of US$487 billion. 
 
Thus, looking at the trade relationship between the US and China on the sole basis of cross-
border trade leads to a 2016 US deficit of US$308 billion. But taking a holistic view of this 
relationship by looking at cross-border and establishment trade together, that deficit is only 
US$65 billion, or 7% of the total trade volume—not that big a figure. This underlines the 
importance of establishment trade for the international competitiveness of US firms—this 
is where their strength lies. 
 
What are policy implications if the US administration wishes to help the country’s firms 
strengthen their international competitiveness? Since all other developed countries, and 
more and more emerging markets, also have substantial outward FDI they should ask 
themselves the same question. Countries need to play to the strength of their firms and, 
therefore, focus on the facilitation of (sustainable) FDI to boost establishment trade and the 
global value chains connected with it, beginning with recognizing this issue and 
formulating appropriate policies.  
 
As it happens, structured discussions aimed at a framework on investment facilitation are 
conducted in the WTO. They seek to facilitate FDI and, with that, establishment trade. The 
US, along with other developed countries, should participate actively in these discussions 
(as China and other developing countries already do), with a view toward achieving, 
soonest, a multilateral framework on the facilitation of sustainable investment. 
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1 The concept of "establishment trade" was developed in reference to the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services to denote the sales associated with commercial presence (Mode 3), basically FDI. See also J. Steven 
Landefeld, Obie G. Whichard and Jeffrey H. Lowe for a discussion of “Alternative frameworks for U.S. 
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international transactions,” Survey of Current Business, December 1993, pp. 50-61. “Establishment trade” is 
used here to refer to sales of all foreign affiliates, regardless of sector. 
2 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2018 (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2018), p. 20. 
3 See, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, https://www.bea.gov/international/usdia2016p.  
4 This amount includes imports from non-US foreign affiliates in China. 
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